An impossibility theorem for matching problems
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Publication:989977
DOI10.1007/S00355-009-0439-8zbMath1198.91158OpenAlexW2137858222MaRDI QIDQ989977
Shigehiro Serizawa, Shohei Takagi
Publication date: 23 August 2010
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/14009
Related Items (4)
Incentives in landing slot problems ⋮ An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm ⋮ Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems ⋮ An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems
Cites Work
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- Implementation of college admission rules
- Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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