An impossibility theorem for matching problems
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:989977)
Recommendations
- The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
- An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof
- On non‐bossy matching rules in two‐sided matching problems
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Implementation of college admission rules
- Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
- Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
- Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
Cited in
(16)- A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof
- Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment
- Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms
- An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems
- Incentives in landing slot problems
- Impossibility results for choice correspondences
- Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems
- Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets
- Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility
- An unfeasible matching problem
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
- Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms
- Counting combinatorial choice rules
- Strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities
- An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
This page was built for publication: An impossibility theorem for matching problems
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q989977)
