An impossibility theorem for matching problems
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Publication:989977
DOI10.1007/S00355-009-0439-8zbMATH Open1198.91158OpenAlexW2137858222MaRDI QIDQ989977FDOQ989977
Authors: Shohei Takagi, Shigehiro Serizawa 
Publication date: 23 August 2010
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/14009
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
- Implementation of college admission rules
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
Cited In (11)
- Impossibility results for choice correspondences
- Counting combinatorial choice rules
- Incentives in landing slot problems
- Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment
- An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
- An unfeasible matching problem
- Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms
- An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems
- Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems
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