An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems
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Cites work
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- An impossibility theorem for matching problems
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
- Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems
- Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
- On cores and indivisibility
- On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
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