Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation
From MaRDI portal
Cites work
- A matroid approach to stable matchings with lower quotas
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach
- Combinatorial optimization. Theory and algorithms
- Competitive auctions and digital goods
- Controlled school choice with soft bounds and overlapping types
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
- Dynamic reserves in matching markets
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- Effective sampling and learning for Mallows models with pairwise-preference data
- Envy-freeness and relaxed stability: hardness and approximation algorithms
- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Impossibility of weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism
- Introduction to algorithms.
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy
- Matching with sizes (or scheduling with processing set restrictions)
- Multidimensional stable roommates with master list
- NON-NULL RANKING MODELS. I
- Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings
- Parallel machine scheduling with job assignment restrictions
- Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts
- Reducibility among combinatorial problems
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
- Stable marriage with ties and bounded length preference lists
- Stable matching with uncertain pairwise preferences
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
- Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The hospitals/residents problem with lower quotas
- The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution
- The structure of stable marriage with indifference
- The three-dimensional stable roommates problem with additively separable preferences
- Three-Dimensional Stabl Matching Problems
- Two algorithms for the student-project allocation problem
- Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: Stable Family and Threesome Roommates Problems
- Weighted matching markets with budget constraints
Cited in
(3)
This page was built for publication: Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6098859)
