A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching

DOI10.1137/1.9781611975994.129MaRDI QIDQ5146917zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rediet Abebe, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline, Richard Cole

Publication date 2 February 2021

Published in Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.07797

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Algorithms in computer science (68Wxx)

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Cited in

(8)

• Tight social welfare approximation of probabilistic serial
• Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World
• Nash social welfare approximation for strategic agents
• More Efficient Match-Making and Satisfiability The Five Card Trick
• Fairly taking turns
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
• Deterministic and universal truthful mechanism for fair matching
• Time-efficient algorithms for Nash-bargaining-based matching market models

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