Tight social welfare approximation of probabilistic serial
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Recommendations
- Social welfare in one-sided matching markets without money
- Social welfare in one-sided matchings: random priority and beyond
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
Cites work
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
- Size versus truncation robustness in the assignment problem
- Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
- Social welfare in one-sided matchings: random priority and beyond
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences
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