Competitive auctions and digital goods
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cited in
(39)- Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing
- Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
- Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing
- Online learning in online auctions
- Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals
- Optimal digital product auctions with unlimited supply and rebidding behavior
- Recent studies of agent incentives in Internet resource allocation and pricing
- Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions
- A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer
- Prior-free multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders
- Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design
- New bounds for the balloon popping problem
- Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
- Unconditional competitive auctions with copy and budget constraints
- Competitive auctions
- Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads
- Envy-free pricing with general supply constraints for unit demand consumers
- Automated design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions
- Auction design with a revenue target
- Serve or skip: the power of rejection in online bottleneck matching
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1947406 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the value of using group discounts under price competition
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1875433 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2119761 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentive-compatible learning of reserve prices for repeated auctions
- Tight revenue gaps among multiunit mechanisms
- Tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms
- Averaging techniques for competitive auctions
- Optimal competitive auctions
- STACS 2004
- Competitive auctions for markets with positive externalities
- Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
- Derandomization of auctions
- Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
- Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation
- A mechanism design approach for multi-party machine learning
- A mechanism design approach for multi-party machine learning
- Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
- Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning
This page was built for publication: Competitive auctions and digital goods
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2768374)
