A mechanism design approach for multi-party machine learning

DOI10.1016/J.TCS.2024.114618MaRDI QIDQ6549677zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Mengjing Chen, Yang Liu, Weiran Shen, Yiheng Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Qiang Yang

Publication date 4 June 2024

Published in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.TCS.2024.114618

zbMATH Keywords

federated learningincentive designmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Mathematical economics (91Bxx)

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Cites work

• A Randomized Parallel Algorithm for Single-Source Shortest Paths
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Algorithms for the Assignment and Transportation Problems
• An Auction Algorithm for Shortest Paths
• Competitive auctions and digital goods
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1022519 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3231692 (Why is no real title available?)
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
• Polynomial auction algorithms for shortest paths
• The discrete bid first auction

Cited in

(1)

• A mechanism design approach for multi-party machine learning

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