Stable matching with uncertain pairwise preferences

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2022.01.028OpenAlexW4206653379MaRDI QIDQ2078608

Péter Biró, Baharak Rastegari, Serge Gaspers, Tamás Fleiner, Ronald de Haan, Haris Aziz, Nicholas Mattei

Publication date: 1 March 2022

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://real.mtak.hu/80727/1/p344.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitytwo-sided matchinguncertain preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Related Items (2)

Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation ⋮ Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences

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• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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