Testable implications of the core in TU market games

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2016.03.005MaRDI QIDQ298364zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yasushi Agatsuma

Publication date 20 June 2016

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.03.005

zbMATH Keywords

market gamesrevealed preferencecore rationalizationPareto rationalizationtestable implications

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Utility theory (91B16) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

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Cites work

• Is utility transferable? A revealed preference analysis
• Nonsmooth analysis
• Rationalizing allocation data -- a nonparametric Walrasian theory when prices are absent or non-Walrasian
• Revealed Preferences and Differentiable Demand
• Testable Restrictions on the Equilibrium Manifold
• Testable implications of Pareto efficiency and individualrationality
• Testable implications of coalitional rationality
• The Construction of Utility Functions from Expenditure Data
• The housing problem and revealed preference theory: duality and an application
• The nonparametric approach to applied welfare analysis

Cited in

(5)

• A utility representation theorem for general revealed preference
• Testable implications of transferable utility
• Testable implications of coalitional rationality
• Recent advances on testability in economic equilibrium models
• Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games

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