Solving coalitional resource games
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Publication:2269130
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2009.09.005zbMath1185.68752OpenAlexW1968092545MaRDI QIDQ2269130
Efrat Manisterski, Sarit Kraus, Paul E. Dunne, Michael Wooldridge
Publication date: 16 March 2010
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2009.09.005
Cooperative games (91A12) Utility theory for games (91A30) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)
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Forming \(k\) coalitions and facilitating relationships in social networks ⋮ A parametric worst-case approach to fairness in cooperative games with transferable utility ⋮ Coalition formation in social environments with logic-based agents1 ⋮ Coalitional games induced by matching problems: complexity and islands of tractability for the Shapley value ⋮ On a Logic for Coalitional Games with Priced-Resource Agents ⋮ Łukasiewicz logics for cooperative games
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