Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies

DOI10.1007/S003550200189MaRDI QIDQ2568809zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gaël Giraud, Céline Rochon

Publication date 19 October 2005

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200189

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.
• Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
• Robust mechanism design of exchange
• Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies

Cited in

(3)

• Generic properties of the core and equilibria of pure exchange economies
• Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.
• Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism

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