Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies

DOI10.1007/S003550200189zbMATH Open1073.91558OpenAlexW2015122038MaRDI QIDQ2568809FDOQ2568809

Authors: Gaël Giraud, Céline Rochon 

Publication date: 19 October 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200189

Recommendations

• Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.
• Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
• Robust mechanism design of exchange
• Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cited In (3)

• Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism
• Generic properties of the core and equilibria of pure exchange economies
• Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.

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