The \textit{ex ante} -core for normal form games with uncertainty
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Publication:1949015
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Cites work
- A generalization of Scarf's theorem: An \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem without transitivity or completeness
- Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
- Generalized Equilibrium Results for Games with Incomplete Information
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 15800 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1558298 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2134813 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
- The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
- The Core of an N Person Game
- Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information
Cited in
(34)- Some infinite-player generalizations of Scarf's theorem: finite-coalition \(\alpha\)-cores and weak \(\alpha\)-cores
- On the core of normal form games with a continuum of players
- Alpha cores of games with nonatomic asymmetric information
- Some generalizations of Kajii's theorem to games with infinitely many players
- Essential stability of the alpha cores of finite games with incomplete information
- Identifying behaviorally robust strategies for normal form games under varying forms of uncertainty
- A weak \(\alpha \)-core existence theorem of games with nonordered preferences and a continuum of agents
- A coalitional extension of generalized fuzzy games
- Competitive equilibria and benefit distributions of population production economies with external increasing returns
- A weak \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem of generalized games with infinitely many players and pseudo-utilities
- The weak \(\alpha\)-core of exchange economies with a continuum of players and pseudo-utilities
- Existence of weakly cooperative equilibria for infinite-leader-infinite-follower games
- NTU core, TU core and strong equilibria of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies
- Essential stability of cooperative equilibria for population games
- Some generalizations of Zhao's theorem: hybrid solutions and weak hybrid solutions for games with nonordered preferences
- An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information
- On the strong hybrid solution of an n-person game
- Relaxed large economies with infinite-dimensional commodity spaces: the existence of Walrasian equilibria
- Cooperative equilibria of finite games with incomplete information
- A social coalitional weak equilibrium existence theorem with a continuum of agents and applications
- Existence and continuity theorems of -core of multi-leader-follower games with set payoffs
- The weak hybrid equilibria of an exchange economy with a continuum of agents and externalities
- Existence of cooperative equilibria for multi-leader-multi-follower population games
- The stability of cooperative equilibria for population games under bounded rationality
- Existence of \(\alpha\)-cores for games without compact assumptions
- On the \(\alpha\)-core of set payoffs games
- Existence and well-posedness of the \(\alpha\)-core for generalized fuzzy games
- Existence of cooperative NS equilibrium for population games with uncertain parameters and its applications
- On the hybrid solutions of set payoff games
- The existence of -core for general cooperative games with infinite or finite players
- The mixed-strategy -core of games with infinitely many pure strategies
- Equilibria in strategy-form games with both noncooperative and cooperative frameworks
- Cooperative equilibria of strategy-form games with both nontransferable and transferable utilities
- The cooperative analysis of oligopoly TU markets with infinitely many firms
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