The \textit{ex ante} \(\alpha\)-core for normal form games with uncertainty
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Publication:1949015
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.01.007zbMath1282.91023MaRDI QIDQ1949015
Publication date: 25 April 2013
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.01.007
normal form games; game with incomplete information; behavioral strategies; \(\alpha\)-core; game with uncertainty
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Cites Work
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