On the core of normal form games with a continuum of players

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2017.06.001zbMATH Open1415.91023arXiv1903.09819OpenAlexW3105105853MaRDI QIDQ1680733FDOQ1680733

Y. Askoura

Publication date: 16 November 2017

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We study the core of normal form games with a continuum of players and without side payments. We consider the weak-core concept, which is an approximation of the core, introduced by Weber, Shapley and Shubik. For payoffs depending on the players' strategy profile, we prove that the weak-core is nonempty. The existence result establishes a weak-core element as a limit of elements in weak-cores of appropriate finite games. We establish by examples that our regularity hypotheses are relevant in the continuum case and the weak-core can be strictly larger than the Aumann's $alpha$-core. For games where payoffs depend on the distribution of players' strategy profile, we prove that analogous regularity conditions ensuring the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria are irrelevant for the non-vacuity of the weak-core.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.09819

Recommendations

• The weak-core of a game in normal form with a continuum of players
• Nearly compact and continuous normal form games: characterizations and equilibrium existence
• ON THE PAYOFF REPRESENTATIONS OF NORMAL FORM GAMES
• An axiomatization of the core for finite and continuum games
• The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint
• The existence of TU \(\alpha\)-core in normal form games
• Normal form structures in extensive form games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7640657
• On the existence of undominated Nash equilibria in normal form games
• Decompositions and potentials for normal form games

zbMATH Keywords

corecontinuum of playersnormal form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Quasi-Equilibria in Markets with Non-Convex Preferences
• Equilibrium points of nonatomic games
• Equilibrium Points of Nonatomic Games Over a Banach Space
• A generalization of Scarf's theorem: An \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem without transitivity or completeness
• A model of equilibrium with differentiated commodities
• The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
• On a theorem of Schmeidler
• On the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
• Pure strategies in games with private information
• The nonemptiness of the \(f\)-core of a game without side payments
• A unifying approach to existence of Nash equilibria
• On the cores of economies with indivisible commodities and a continuum of traders
• The \textit{ex ante} \(\alpha\)-core for normal form games with uncertainty
• The Core of an Economy with a Measure Space of Economic Agents
• Existence of Approximate Equilibria and Cores
• Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
• The epsilon core of a large replica game
• Approximate Cores of Large Games
• Continuity Properties of the Core of a Market
• On equilibrium allocations as distributions on the commodity space
• Remarks on Weak Compactness in L₁(μ,X)
• A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
• Weak Compactness in L 1 (μ, X)
• On the existence of Cournot-Nash equilibria in continuum games
• On the nonemptiness of the \(\alpha\)-core of discontinuous games: transferable and nontransferable utilities
• Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores
• On \(\varepsilon\)-cores of balanced games
• Some results on the weak core of a non-side-payment game with infinitely many players
• Some theorems on the core of a non-sidepayment game with a measure space of players
• Strong Core Theorems with Nonconvex Preferences
• On Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Distributions for Games With a Nonmetrizable Action Space and Upper Semicontinuous Payoffs
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The weak-core of a game in normal form with a continuum of players
• Continuity Properties of the Core of a Market: A Correction
• Equilibrium points of nonatomic games over a nonreflexive Banach space
• An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information

Cited In (23)

• A unified approach to the Nash equilibrium existence in large games from finitely many players to infinitely many players
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Existence of \(\alpha\)-cores for games without compact assumptions
• On the \(\alpha\)-core of set payoffs games
• Some generalizations of Kajii's theorem to games with infinitely many players
• Decompositions and potentials for normal form games
• A weak \(\alpha \)-core existence theorem of games with nonordered preferences and a continuum of agents
• A weak \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem of generalized games with infinitely many players and pseudo-utilities
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Competitive equilibria and benefit distributions of population production economies with external increasing returns
• The weak \(\alpha\)-core of exchange economies with a continuum of players and pseudo-utilities
• Essential stability of cooperative equilibria for population games
• Some generalizations of Zhao's theorem: hybrid solutions and weak hybrid solutions for games with nonordered preferences
• A social coalitional weak equilibrium existence theorem with a continuum of agents and applications
• An adjusted payoff-based procedure for normal form games
• A coalitional extension of generalized fuzzy games
• NTU core, TU core and strong equilibria of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies
• The weak hybrid equilibria of an exchange economy with a continuum of agents and externalities
• Existence of weakly cooperative equilibria for infinite-leader-infinite-follower games
• Rectangularity and tightness: A normal form characterization of perfect information extensive game forms
• The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results

This page was built for publication: On the core of normal form games with a continuum of players

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1680733)