Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores
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Publication:924944
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.06.006zbMath1135.91319OpenAlexW2059201184MaRDI QIDQ924944
Publication date: 29 May 2008
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.06.006
Related Items (8)
On the core of normal form games with a continuum of players ⋮ Allocation rules for coalitional network games ⋮ Market Games and Clubs ⋮ Networks and Stability ⋮ On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games ⋮ The weak-core of a game in normal form with a continuum of players ⋮ Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment ⋮ Convergence of the approximate cores to the aspiration core in partitioning games
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