Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2007.06.006MaRDI QIDQ924944zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Myrna Wooders

Publication date 29 May 2008

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.06.006

zbMATH Keywords

approximate coreclubsgames with many playerslocal public goodsNTU coresmall group effectiveness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
• A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma
• Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.
• Approximate Cores of Large Games
• Approximate cores of replica games and economies. I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Cores of partitioning games
• Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments nonemptiness and equal treatment
• Equivalence of Games and Markets
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139280 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3547015 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 978457 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784578 (Why is no real title available?)
• Inessentiality of large groups and the approximate core property: An equivalence theorem
• Laws of scarcity for a finite game-exact bounds on estimations
• Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores
• Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes
• Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
• Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods
• The Core of an N Person Game
• The epsilon core of a large replica game
• The nonemptiness of the \(f\)-core of a game without side payments
• The partnered core of a game without side payments
• Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics
• When is the core equivalence theorem valid?

Cited in

(14)

• Inessentiality of large groups and the approximate core property: An equivalence theorem
• On the core of normal form games with a continuum of players
• Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment
• Convergence of the approximate cores to the aspiration core in partitioning games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 978457 (Why is no real title available?)
• Small improving coalitions and small group effectiveness
• On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games
• Market games and clubs
• Networks and stability
• The weak-core of a game in normal form with a continuum of players
• An Exact Bound on Epsilon for Nonemptiness of Epsilon Cores of Games
• Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments nonemptiness and equal treatment
• Approximate cores of replica games and economies. I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores
• Allocation rules for coalitional network games

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