Laws of scarcity for a finite game-exact bounds on estimations
DOI10.1007/S00199-003-0443-7zbMATH Open1132.91336OpenAlexW2064831938MaRDI QIDQ2486955FDOQ2486955
Authors: Alexander Kovalenkov, Myrna Wooders
Publication date: 17 August 2005
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269585/files/twerp691.pdf
Recommendations
MonotonicityCooperative gamesClubsApproximate coresCyclic monotonicityEffective small groupsGames with side payments (TU games)Law of demandLaw of scarcityParameterized collections of games.
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
Cited In (6)
- Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores
- Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes
- On the core of dynamic cooperative games
- Strong and weak rarity value: resource games with complex price-scarcity relationships
- Comparative statics and laws of scarcity for games
- Market games and clubs
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