Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation

DOI10.1007/s00199-015-0915-6zbMath1367.91081OpenAlexW1716679481MaRDI QIDQ315802

Jaeok Park, Jinhyuk Lee

Publication date: 23 September 2016

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0915-6

zbMATH Keywords

cutoff equilibriaparticipation costssecond-price auctionssequential participation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Prices versus auctions in large markets ⋮ Price competition or price leadership

Cites Work

• Participation constraints in the Vickrey auction
• Competitive bidding with entry costs
• Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry
• Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
• Auctions with entry
• Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs
• Auctions with costly information acquisition
• Auction design with opportunity cost
• Coordination in auctions with entry
• A common value auction model with endogeneous entry and information acquisition
• Sequential selling mechanisms
• Optimal search auctions
• Participation costs and efficient auctions
• Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation
• Information Acquisition in Auctions
• Second-price auctions with private entry costs

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