Information architecture and its impact on the equilibrium for all-pay auction models

zbMATH Open1240.91038MaRDI QIDQ3171208FDOQ3171208

Authors: Wenlei Chen, Xianjia Wang 

Publication date: 29 September 2011

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zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationauctionstrategy equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Cited In (2)

• Equilibrium existence and expected payoffs in all-pay auctions with constraints
• The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

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