Persuasion as a contest
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Publication:690692
DOI10.1007/S00199-009-0497-2zbMATH Open1262.91051OpenAlexW2270493928MaRDI QIDQ690692FDOQ690692
Stergios Skaperdas, Samarth Vaidya
Publication date: 28 November 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0497-2
Recommendations
Decision theory (91B06) Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)
Cites Work
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- The all-pay auction with complete information
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- Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources
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- The politics of randomness
- The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
- Incorporating unawareness into contract theory
- Costly enforcement of property rights and the Coase theorem
- Contest success functions: an extension
Cited In (15)
- Persuasion with costly precision
- Waiting to Persuade
- Inefficiency in the shadow of unobservable reservation payoffs
- Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit
- Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production
- Slow persuasion
- Competition in costly talk
- EFFECTIVE PERSUASION
- Polarization and conflict among groups with heterogeneous members
- Persuasion and receiver's news
- Contests with dominant strategies
- Competition in persuasion: an experiment
- Resisting persuasion
- The interaction of emotions and cost-shifting rules in civil litigation
- Skepticism and credulity: a model and applications to political spin, belief formation, and decision weights
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