Persuasion as a contest

DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0497-2zbMath1262.91051OpenAlexW2270493928MaRDI QIDQ690692

Stergios Skaperdas, Samarth Vaidya

Publication date: 28 November 2012

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0497-2

zbMATH Keywords

litigationadvertisingproperty rightsrent-seekingpolitical campaigning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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