Contests with productive effort

DOI10.1007/S00182-013-0393-7zbMATH Open1296.91135OpenAlexW2010824196MaRDI QIDQ403965FDOQ403965

Authors: Ron Siegel 

Publication date: 29 August 2014

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0393-7

Recommendations

• Simple equilibria in general contests
• All-Pay Contests
• Degree of difficulty as the objective of contest design
• Contests where there is variation in the marginal productivity of effort
• Success in contests

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctionscontestsnon-monotonic payoffs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• All-Pay Contests
• An all-pay auction with a pure-strategy equilibrium

Cited In (19)

• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
• Efficiency-based measures of inequality
• Asymmetric endogenous prize contests
• Competition and equilibrium effort choice
• Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort
• Contests with discontinuous payoffs
• Pre-contest communication incentives
• Relative performance compensation, contests, and dynamic incentives
• Contests where there is variation in the marginal productivity of effort
• Incentives in lottery contests with draws
• Incentives versus competitive balance
• Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers
• On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests
• Rewarding effort
• Contest with pre-contest investment
• Far above others
• Degree of difficulty as the objective of contest design
• A note on modelling tournaments
• Study of psychological preferences in working contest

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