Generalized contest success functions

DOI10.1007/S00199-007-0328-2MaRDI QIDQ1016327zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Birendra K. Rai, Rajiv Sarin

Publication date 5 May 2009

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0328-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Recommendations

• Contest success functions
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Cites work

• Asymmetric contests with general technologies
• Contest success functions
• Contest success functions: an extension
• Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources

Cited in

(22)

• Contest success functions: an extension
• Contest success functions
• Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach
• Additive multi-effort contests
• Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: axiomatization
• Foundations for contest success functions
• Relative difference contest success function
• A contest success function for rankings
• Axiomatization of reverse nested lottery contests
• Contests with dominant strategies
• On a class of contest success functions
• Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models
• Trade and expropriation
• The market for protection and the origin of the state
• Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit
• Group contest success function: the heterogeneous individuals case
• Equilibrium effort in games with homogeneous production functions and homogeneous valuation
• Diversification and information in contests
• Equivalence of optimal noisy-ranking contests and Tullock contests
• Investing in influence: how minority interests can prevail in a democracy
• The role of polarization and hostility on equilibria in a simple class of symmetric conflict models
• Group contest success functions

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