Who gains from information asymmetry?

DOI10.1007/S11238-013-9351-XMaRDI QIDQ368065zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gil S. Epstein, Yosef Mealem

Publication date 18 September 2013

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96072

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationasymmetric contestsrent-seeking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Information in conflicts.
• Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests
• Common-value contests with asymmetric information
• Information in Tullock contests
• Multi-player contests with asymmetric information

Cites work

• A general model of information sharing in oligopoly
• Information in conflicts.
• The politics of randomness

Cited in

(8)

• Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information
• Asymmetric type recognition with applications to dilemma games
• Information in conflicts.
• Partial information disclosure in a contest
• The role of information in contests
• Social welfare in search games with asymmetric information
• Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests
• Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants' types

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