Existence, Uniqueness, and Comparative Statics in Contests

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_14zbMath1417.91240OpenAlexW2247063913MaRDI QIDQ4555515

Martin Kaae Jensen

Publication date: 20 November 2018

Published in: Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/RePEc/lec/leecon/dp15-16.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumpayoff functioncontest success functionpositive shockstrategic substitute

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

The limits of meritocracy, Optimally biased contests with draws, Equilibrium characterization and shock propagation in conflict networks, Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information, Monotone comparative statics in games with non-monotonic best-replies: contests and Cournot oligopoly

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