Modeling and Computing Two-Settlement Oligopolistic Equilibrium in a Congested Electricity Network
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3392152
DOI10.1287/OPRE.1070.0416zbMATH Open1167.90408OpenAlexW2158244088MaRDI QIDQ3392152FDOQ3392152
Authors: Jian Yao, Ilan Adler, Shmuel S. Oren 
Publication date: 13 August 2009
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4bz9j4wr
Recommendations
- An optimization-based conjectured supply function equilibrium model for network constrained electricity markets
- Spatial Oligopolistic Electricity Models with Cournot Generators and Regulated Transmission Prices
- Using EPECs to Model Bilevel Games in Restructured Electricity Markets with Locational Prices
- An MPEC reformulation of an EPEC model for electricity markets
- Nash-Cournot Equilibria in Electric Power Markets with Piecewise Linear Demand Functions and Joint Constraints
Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Noncooperative games (91A10)
Cited In (37)
- Using EPECs to Model Bilevel Games in Restructured Electricity Markets with Locational Prices
- Renewable portfolio standards in the presence of green consumers and emissions trading
- A population‐based approach to the bi‐level multifollower problem: an application to the electricity retail market
- Potential impact of recharging plug-in hybrid electric vehicles on locational marginal prices
- Analysis of M-stationary points to an EPEC modeling oligopolistic competition in an electricity spot market
- Multimodal transportation flows in energy networks with an application to crude oil markets
- On the Role of a Market Maker in Networked Cournot Competition
- Multi-period near-equilibrium in a pool-based electricity market including on/off decisions
- Electricity market near-equilibrium under locational marginal pricing and minimum profit conditions
- Three modeling paradigms in mathematical programming
- Two-stage non-cooperative games with risk-averse players
- Nonconvex equilibrium models for gas market analysis: failure of standard techniques and alternative modeling approaches
- A game-theoretic analysis of transmission-distribution system operator coordination
- Solving oligopolistic equilibrium problems with convex optimization
- On the efficiency of local electricity markets under decentralized and centralized designs: a multi-leader Stackelberg game analysis
- Two-stage stochastic variational inequalities: theory, algorithms and applications
- Transparency and control in platforms for networked markets
- Incorporating oligopoly, CO\(_{2}\) emissions trading and green certificates into a power generation expansion model
- On supply-function equilibria in radial transmission networks
- A Benders decomposition method for solving stochastic complementarity problems with an application in energy
- A shared-constraint approach to multi-leader multi-follower games
- Feasibility problems with complementarity constraints
- Modeling strategic investment decisions in spatial markets
- Two-settlement electricity markets with price caps and Cournot generation firms
- A tractable multi-leader multi-follower peak-load-pricing model with strategic interaction
- A comparison of electricity market designs in networks
- Flexible supply meets flexible demand: prosumer impact on strategic hydro operations
- Electric power network oligopoly as a dynamic Stackelberg game
- An optimization-based conjectured supply function equilibrium model for network constrained electricity markets
- An MPEC reformulation of an EPEC model for electricity markets
- Tacit collusion games in pool-based electricity markets under transmission constraints
- Stochastic Nash equilibrium problems: sample average approximation and applications
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On an equilibrium problem with complementarity constraints formulation of pay-as-clear electricity market with demand elasticity
- Technology selection and capacity investment under uncertainty
- Spatial Oligopolistic Electricity Models with Cournot Generators and Regulated Transmission Prices
- Addressing supply-side risk in uncertain power markets: stochastic Nash models, scalable algorithms and error analysis
Uses Software
This page was built for publication: Modeling and Computing Two-Settlement Oligopolistic Equilibrium in a Congested Electricity Network
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3392152)
