Modeling and Computing Two-Settlement Oligopolistic Equilibrium in a Congested Electricity Network

From MaRDI portal
Publication:3392152

DOI10.1287/opre.1070.0416zbMath1167.90408OpenAlexW2158244088MaRDI QIDQ3392152

Shmuel S. Oren, Jian Yao, Ilan Adler

Publication date: 13 August 2009

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4bz9j4wr




Related Items (24)

Renewable portfolio standards in the presence of green consumers and emissions tradingElectric power network oligopoly as a dynamic Stackelberg gameNonconvex equilibrium models for gas market analysis: failure of standard techniques and alternative modeling approachesFeasibility problems with complementarity constraintsOn supply-function equilibria in radial transmission networksStochastic Nash equilibrium problems: sample average approximation and applicationsTacit collusion games in pool-based electricity markets under transmission constraintsThree modeling paradigms in mathematical programmingTransparency and Control in Platforms for Networked MarketsTwo-stage non-cooperative games with risk-averse playersFlexible supply meets flexible demand: prosumer impact on strategic hydro operationsOn the Role of a Market Maker in Networked Cournot CompetitionA shared-constraint approach to multi-leader multi-follower gamesModeling strategic investment decisions in spatial marketsA game-theoretic analysis of transmission-distribution system operator coordinationTechnology selection and capacity investment under uncertaintyA Benders decomposition method for solving stochastic complementarity problems with an application in energyMultimodal transportation flows in energy networks with an application to crude oil marketsAn MPEC reformulation of an EPEC model for electricity marketsPotential impact of recharging plug-in hybrid electric vehicles on locational marginal pricesTwo-stage stochastic variational inequalities: theory, algorithms and applicationsOn the efficiency of local electricity markets under decentralized and centralized designs: a multi-leader Stackelberg game analysisA tractable multi-leader multi-follower peak-load-pricing model with strategic interactionAddressing supply-side risk in uncertain power markets: stochastic Nash models, scalable algorithms and error analysis


Uses Software



This page was built for publication: Modeling and Computing Two-Settlement Oligopolistic Equilibrium in a Congested Electricity Network