On an equilibrium problem with complementarity constraints formulation of pay-as-clear electricity market with demand elasticity
DOI10.1007/S10898-017-0595-9zbMATH Open1384.49032OpenAlexW2772110183MaRDI QIDQ1702865FDOQ1702865
Authors: Didier Aussel, E. Allevi, Rossana Riccardi 
Publication date: 1 March 2018
Published in: Journal of Global Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10898-017-0595-9
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Cites Work
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- Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid electricity market. II: Best response of a producer
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Cited In (11)
- Bilevel Nash equilibrium problems: numerical approximation via direct-search methods
- A Stochastic Electricity Market Clearing Formulation with Consistent Pricing Properties
- Electricity market near-equilibrium under locational marginal pricing and minimum profit conditions
- A short state of the art on multi-leader-follower games
- A bilevel optimization approach of energy transition in freight transport: SOS1 method and application to the Ecuadorian case
- Extensions of Nash games in finite and infinite dimensions with applications
- Value at risk approach to producer's best response in an electricity market with uncertain demand
- Nonlinear complementarity approach to the pricing of spinning reserve market
- Multiscale control of Stackelberg games
- Solving quadratic multi-leader-follower games by smoothing the follower's best response
- Bilevel optimization: theory, algorithms, applications and a bibliography
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