Solving quadratic multi-leader-follower games by smoothing the follower's best response
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Publication:5038441
DOI10.1080/10556788.2020.1828412zbMATH Open1501.91036arXiv1808.07941OpenAlexW3093327601MaRDI QIDQ5038441FDOQ5038441
Authors: Michael Herty, S. Steffensen, Anna Thünen 
Publication date: 30 September 2022
Published in: Optimization Methods \& Software (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We derive Nash equilibria for a class of quadratic multi-leader-follower games using the nonsmooth best response function. To overcome the challenge of nonsmoothness, we pursue a smoothing approach resulting in a reformulation as a smooth Nash equilibrium problem. The existence and uniqueness of solutions are proven for all smoothing parameters. Accumulation points of Nash equilibria exist for a decreasing sequence of these smoothing parameters and we show that these candidates fulfill the conditions of s-stationarity and are Nash equilibria to the multi-leader-follower game. Finally, we propose an update on the leader variables for efficient computation and numerically compare nonsmooth Newton and subgradient methods.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.07941
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Cited In (5)
- Bilevel Nash equilibrium problems: numerical approximation via direct-search methods
- Extensions of Nash games in finite and infinite dimensions with applications
- Relaxation approaches for nonlinear sparse optimization problems
- A method for multi-leader-multi-follower games by smoothing the followers' response function
- Existence, uniqueness, and computation of robust Nash equilibria in a class of multi-leader-follower games
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