Generation Capacity Expansion in Imperfectly Competitive Restructured Electricity Markets

DOI10.1287/opre.1050.0211zbMath1165.91342OpenAlexW2110925667MaRDI QIDQ5322125

Publication date: 18 July 2009

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/bc5dbcf94a69639f9ed65717c048562aa33cd05b

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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