Perfectly competitive capacity expansion games with risk-averse participants
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Publication:2397828
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3769296 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in
(8)- Two-stage stochastic variational inequalities for Cournot-Nash equilibrium with risk-averse players under uncertainty
- Two-stage non-cooperative games with risk-averse players
- Two-stage stochastic variational inequalities: theory, algorithms and applications
- Price-coupling games and the generation expansion planning problem
- Games and teams with shared constraints
- On the multiplicity of solutions in generation capacity investment models with incomplete markets: a risk-averse stochastic equilibrium approach
- Robust market equilibria under uncertain cost
- An equilibrium model of the supply chain network under multi-attribute behaviors analysis
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