Perfectly competitive capacity expansion games with risk-averse participants

DOI10.1007/S10589-015-9798-5zbMATH Open1367.91021OpenAlexW1813123331MaRDI QIDQ2397828FDOQ2397828

Jong-Shi Pang, B. F. Hobbs, Dane A. Schiro

Publication date: 23 May 2017

Published in: Computational Optimization and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10589-015-9798-5

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zbMATH Keywords

existence of solutioncomplementarity problemscompetitive capacity expansion models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic programming (90C15) Noncooperative games (91A10) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33)

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Cited In (8)

• Two-stage stochastic variational inequalities for Cournot-Nash equilibrium with risk-averse players under uncertainty
• Two-stage non-cooperative games with risk-averse players
• Two-stage stochastic variational inequalities: theory, algorithms and applications
• Price-coupling games and the generation expansion planning problem
• Games and teams with shared constraints
• On the multiplicity of solutions in generation capacity investment models with incomplete markets: a risk-averse stochastic equilibrium approach
• Robust market equilibria under uncertain cost
• An equilibrium model of the supply chain network under multi-attribute behaviors analysis

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