Open versus closed loop capacity equilibria in electricity markets under perfect and oligopolistic competition

DOI10.1007/s10107-013-0696-2zbMath1273.90113OpenAlexW2003956845MaRDI QIDQ368753

Mohammad Hasan, M. Dambrine, H. S. Yoon

Publication date: 23 September 2013

Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-013-0696-2

zbMATH Keywords

noncooperative gamescapacity pre-commitmentequilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC)generation expansion planning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Operations research and management science (90B99)

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Cites Work

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• Open versus closed loop capacity equilibria in electricity markets under perfect and oligopolistic competition
• Cournot competition, forward markets and efficiency
• Solving multi-leader–common-follower games
• Price Regulation under Demand Uncertainty
• Using EPECs to Model Bilevel Games in Restructured Electricity Markets with Locational Prices
• Generation Capacity Expansion in Imperfectly Competitive Restructured Electricity Markets

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