Pretending in dynamic games, alternative outcomes and application to electricity markets
DOI10.1007/s13235-017-0229-3zbMath1411.91115OpenAlexW2747629947MaRDI QIDQ1741201
Alexandros C. Charalampidis, Ioannis Kordonis, George P. Papavassilopoulos
Publication date: 3 May 2019
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-017-0229-3
electricity marketsmanipulationdynamic games with incomplete informationlearning/adaptation in gamespretending
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) 2-person games (91A05) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Dynamic games (91A25) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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