Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple firms and setup costs
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2017.09.002zbMATH Open1415.91077OpenAlexW2759989318MaRDI QIDQ1680146FDOQ1680146
Authors: Antonio Tesoriere 
Publication date: 22 November 2017
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.09.002
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supermodular gamesStackelberg equilibriumsetup costsexistence of equilibriumentry deterrencenon quasiconcave payoff
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
Cites Work
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Cited In (7)
- A note on Stackelberg competition
- Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium
- Stable sharing rules and participation in pools of essential patents
- Stackelberg leadership with product differentiation and endogenous entry: some comparative static and limiting results
- When Stackelberg and Cournot Equilibria Coincide
- Bilevel optimization: theory, algorithms, applications and a bibliography
- Existence of Drèze equilibrium under set-up costs
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