A linear generalization of Stackelberg's model

DOI10.1007/S11238-008-9126-YMaRDI QIDQ993501zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thierry Lafay

Publication date 20 September 2010

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9126-y

zbMATH Keywords

preemptionCournot competitionStackelberg

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cites work

• First Mover and Second Mover Advantages

Cited in

(6)

• Welfare-improving effect of a small number of followers in a Stackelberg model
• Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple firms and setup costs
• How many firms should be leaders? Beneficial concentration revisited
• On hierarchical competition in oligopoly
• Strategic behavior under partial cooperation
• On Stackelberg-Nash equilibria in bilevel optimization games

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