A linear generalization of Stackelberg's model
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Publication:993501
DOI10.1007/S11238-008-9126-YzbMATH Open1233.91177OpenAlexW1972781699MaRDI QIDQ993501FDOQ993501
Authors: Thierry Lafay
Publication date: 20 September 2010
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9126-y
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
Cited In (6)
- Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple firms and setup costs
- On hierarchical competition in oligopoly
- Welfare-improving effect of a small number of followers in a Stackelberg model
- Strategic behavior under partial cooperation
- On Stackelberg-Nash equilibria in bilevel optimization games
- How many firms should be leaders? Beneficial concentration revisited
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