The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.046zbMath1283.91102OpenAlexW3125701976MaRDI QIDQ2440456

Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication date: 18 March 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43407/1/MPRA_paper_43407.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractsresearch and developmenthold-up problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (1)

Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm

Cites Work

• Minimum wages and excessive effort supply
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Moral hazard and limited liability: The real effects of contract bargaining
• Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
• Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
• Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts
• The Management of Innovation

This page was built for publication: The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability