All-or-nothing information control

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90116-3zbMATH Open0729.90961OpenAlexW2089746286MaRDI QIDQ807356FDOQ807356

David E. M. Sappington, Tracy R. Lewis

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90116-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs

Cited In (8)

• Ignorance in a multi-agent setting
• Emotional decision-makers and anomalous attitudes towards information
• Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Pessimistic information gathering
• Designing contracts and information jointly
• GATHERING INFORMATION BY A PARTIALLY INFORMED AGENT
• Does more information-gathering effort raise or lower the average quantity produced?

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