Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria

DOI10.1142/S0219198903001057zbMath1058.91004MaRDI QIDQ4433466

Carlos Alós-Ferrer

Publication date: 2003

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

learning; best reply dynamics; imitation dynamics; Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

Related Items

Learning and market clearing: theory and experiments, General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions, Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games, Strategy selection in structured populations, The \(\sigma\) law of evolutionary dynamics in community-structured population, Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency, Robust stochastic stability, BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS IN A BIRTH-DEATH MODEL OF EVOLUTION IN GAMES

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