An evolutionary interpretation of mixed-strategy equilibria

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0550zbMath0891.90187MaRDI QIDQ1378024

Jörg Oechssler

Publication date: 5 February 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/9a4cd88f68da7f09a05796dc63147bb80ca3fff6

zbMATH Keywords

mixed-strategy equilibria; evolutionary, stochastic learning process

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

92D15: Problems related to evolution

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

Evolutionary game dynamics, Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria, DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE, ABSENT–MINDED DRIVERS IN THE LAB: TESTING GILBOA'S MODEL, A mixed cooperative dual to the Nash equilibrium, Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games, On (un)knots and dynamics in games, When are efficient conventions selected in networks?, Robust stochastic stability, Long-run technology choice with endogenous local capacity

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Learning mixed equilibria
• Three problems in learning mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
• An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
• Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection
• Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
• Evolution of equilibria in the long run: A general theory and applications
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Non-cooperative games
• An iterative method of solving a game
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents
• Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions