An evolutionary interpretation of mixed-strategy equilibria
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Publication:1378024
DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0550zbMATH Open0891.90187OpenAlexW2166674925MaRDI QIDQ1378024FDOQ1378024
Publication date: 5 February 1998
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/9a4cd88f68da7f09a05796dc63147bb80ca3fff6
Cites Work
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- Non-cooperative games
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Learning mixed equilibria
- Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
- Three problems in learning mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
- Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
- Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection
- An iterative method of solving a game
- Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
- Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
- Evolution of equilibria in the long run: A general theory and applications
- Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents
Cited In (17)
- Evolution and strategic stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens
- A mixed cooperative dual to the Nash equilibrium
- Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria
- Robust stochastic stability
- Long-run technology choice with endogenous local capacity
- An evolutionary game-theoretic model for ethno-religious conflicts between two groups
- Heterogeneity in evolutionary games: an analysis of the risk perception
- Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
- ABSENTโMINDED DRIVERS IN THE LAB: TESTING GILBOA'S MODEL
- The evolution of cooperation in mixed games
- When are efficient conventions selected in networks?
- Combining Rational Choice and Evolutionary Dynamics: The Indirect Evolutionary Approach
- Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games
- On (un)knots and dynamics in games
- Indirect evolution and aggregate-taking behavior in a football league: utility maximization, profit maximization, and success
- Evolutionary game dynamics
- DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE
Recommendations
- Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with mixed strategies ๐ ๐
- The evolution of cooperation in mixed games ๐ ๐
- On a continuous mixed strategies model for evolutionary game theory ๐ ๐
- Evolutionarily stable sets in mixed-strategist models ๐ ๐
- Evolution and mixed strategies ๐ ๐
- The role of mixed strategies in spatial evolutionary games ๐ ๐
- Evolutionary game theory in mixed strategies: from microscopic interactions to kinetic equations ๐ ๐
- Evolution of Mixed Strategies in Monotone Games ๐ ๐
- Title not available (Why is that?) ๐ ๐
- Title not available (Why is that?) ๐ ๐
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