scientific article

zbMath0739.92012MaRDI QIDQ3975599

Franz J. Weissing

Publication date: 26 June 1992

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic stabilityglobal attractorevolutionary stabilitysupercritical Hopf bifurcationNash equilibrium strategyasymptotically stable fixed pointlocal stability propertiesSaccharomyces cerevisiaediscrete replicator dynamicsevolutionary normal form gamesRock-Scissors-Paper gameRSP-gamesselection experiments in chemostats

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of game theory (91A80) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Control/observation systems governed by ordinary differential equations (93C15) Genetics and population dynamics (92D99)

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