Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite asymmetric two-deme population and emergence of cooperation

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.07.025zbMath1400.91064WikidataQ50780691 ScholiaQ50780691MaRDI QIDQ1798116

Sabin Lessard, Véronique Ladret

Publication date: 23 October 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.07.025

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theory; fixation probability; one-third law; structured coalescent; iterated prisonner's dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

92D10: Genetics and epigenetics

91A22: Evolutionary games

Related Items

Fixation probability with multiple alleles and projected average allelic effect on selection, Stochastic evolution of staying together, Conditions for cooperation to be more abundant than defection in a hierarchically structured population, Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private information, Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game, Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite continental island population model and emergence of cooperation, First-order effect of frequency-dependent selection on fixation probability in an age-structured population with application to a public goods game, The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory, Evolution of cooperation in a multidimensional phenotype space

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