Fixation probability for a beneficial allele and a mutant strategy in a linear game under weak selection in a finite island model

DOI10.1016/j.tpb.2007.04.001zbMath1147.92030OpenAlexW2050706052WikidataQ80389313 ScholiaQ80389313MaRDI QIDQ935956

Sabin Lessard, Véronique Ladret

Publication date: 12 August 2008

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2007.04.001

zbMATH Keywords

Coalescence timesEvolutionary game theoryOne-third law

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Genetics and epigenetics (92D10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (11)

Aspiration can promote cooperation in well-mixed populations as in regular graphs ⋮ Fixation probabilities and hitting times for low levels of frequency-dependent selection ⋮ Evolutionary and convergence stability for continuous phenotypes in finite populations derived from two-allele models ⋮ Evolution of cooperation in a multidimensional phenotype space ⋮ Social evolution and genetic interactions in the short and long term ⋮ Conditions for cooperation to be more abundant than defection in a hierarchically structured population ⋮ First-order effect of frequency-dependent selection on fixation probability in an age-structured population with application to a public goods game ⋮ Fixation probability with multiple alleles and projected average allelic effect on selection ⋮ Perturbation expansions of multilocus fixation probabilities for frequency-dependent selection with applications to the Hill-Robertson effect and to the joint evolution of helping and punishment ⋮ Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite asymmetric two-deme population and emergence of cooperation ⋮ Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite continental island population model and emergence of cooperation

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