Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite continental island population model and emergence of cooperation
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Publication:2105710
DOI10.1007/s13235-022-00443-1zbMath1505.91082WikidataQ113353955 ScholiaQ113353955MaRDI QIDQ2105710
Publication date: 8 December 2022
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00443-1
finite population; evolutionary game theory; fixation probability; structured coalescent; one third law
Cites Work
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