Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite continental island population model and emergence of cooperation

DOI10.1007/s13235-022-00443-1zbMath1505.91082WikidataQ113353955 ScholiaQ113353955MaRDI QIDQ2105710

Véronique Ladret

Publication date: 8 December 2022

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00443-1

zbMATH Keywords

finite population; evolutionary game theory; fixation probability; structured coalescent; one third law

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

92D25: Population dynamics (general)

91A22: Evolutionary games

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