Strong migration limit for games in structured populations: applications to dominance hierarchy and set structure

DOI10.3390/G6030318MaRDI QIDQ1651807zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dhaker Kroumi, Sabin Lessard

Publication date 10 July 2018

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g6030318

zbMATH Keywords

prisoner's dilemmareproductive valuedominance hierarchystructured coalescentabundance in frequencyset-structured populations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical geography and demography (91D20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Recommendations

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Cites work

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1094275 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3194920 (Why is no real title available?)
• A convergence theorem for markov chains arising in population genetics and the coalescent with selfing
• Conditions for cooperation to be more abundant than defection in a hierarchically structured population
• Dominance hierarchies induce a population's full cooperation
• Effective game matrix and inclusive payoff in group-structured populations
• Evolution of cooperation in a multidimensional phenotype space
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation
• Functions of Matrices
• Game theory and physics
• On the Existence and Uniqueness of the Real Logarithm of a Matrix
• The coalescent
• The evolution of cooperation
• The strong-migration limit for the genealogical process in geographically structured populations
• The strong-migration limit in geographically structured populations

Cited in

(8)

• Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite continental island population model and emergence of cooperation
• Diffusion approximation for an age-class-structured population under viability and fertility selection with application to fixation probability of an advantageous mutant
• First-order effect of frequency-dependent selection on fixation probability in an age-structured population with application to a public goods game
• Evolutionary game with stochastic payoffs in a finite island model
• Frequency-dependent growth in class-structured populations: continuous dynamics in the limit of weak selection
• Average abundancy of cooperation in multi-player games with random payoffs
• The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory
• Evolution of cooperation with respect to fixation probabilities in multi-player games with random payoffs

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