Stochastic sampling of interaction partners versus deterministic payoff assignment
DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2008.12.025zbMATH Open1400.91083OpenAlexW1985392287WikidataQ83235496 ScholiaQ83235496MaRDI QIDQ1617752FDOQ1617752
Authors: Benno Woelfing, Arne Traulsen 
Publication date: 8 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.12.025
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evolutionary dynamicsevolutionary game theoryfrequency-dependent selectiondeterministic versus stochastic payoffspayoff assignment
Problems related to evolution (92D15) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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Cited In (10)
- An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
- Fixation times in evolutionary games with the Moran and Fermi processes
- Local replicator dynamics: a simple link between deterministic and stochastic models of evolutionary game theory
- Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity
- Iterated snowdrift game among mobile agents with myopic expected-reward based decision rule: numerical and analytical research
- Experiments on individual strategy updating in iterated snowdrift game under random rematching
- Fixation probabilities of random mutants under frequency dependent selection
- Dynamic properties of evolutionary multi-player games in finite populations
- Evolutionary multiplayer games
- Do not aim too high nor too low: moderate expectation-based group formation promotes public cooperation on networks
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