Equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching of players

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2004.07.019MaRDI QIDQ776439zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Jacek Miękisz

Publication date 9 July 2020

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0409026

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionevolutionarily stable strategypopulation dynamicsstochastic stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)

Abstract: We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant one, where players are averse to risks. We assume that individuals play with randomly chosen opponents (they do not play against average strategies as in the standard replicator dynamics). We show that the long-run behavior of a population depends on its size and the mutation level.

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Cited in

(17)

• Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks
• Evolution, population growth, and history dependence
• Stochastic sampling of interaction partners versus deterministic payoff assignment
• Evolutionary games and matching rules
• Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
• Match choice and Ghettoization in evolutionary games
• Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations
• Multi-level evolution in population games
• Type of noise defines global attractors in bistable molecular regulatory systems
• Population dynamics with a stable efficient equilibrium
• Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching
• Pairwise comparison dynamics and evolutionary foundations for Nash equilibrium
• Stochastic stability in three-player games with time delays
• Equilibrium strategies in two-sided mate choice problem with age preferences
• Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5375558 (Why is no real title available?)
• Reflective evolution under strategic uncertainty

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