Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2003.10.005zbMATH Open1099.91021OpenAlexW2093644609MaRDI QIDQ1886752FDOQ1886752

Paul Rhode, Mark Stegeman

Publication date: 19 November 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.005

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• Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Markov chains and stochastic stability
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• On the dynamic foundation of evolutionary stability in continuous models.
• Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations
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• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces
• An evolutionary model of Bertrand oligopoly
• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Kin selection and strong evolutionary stability of mutual help
• Equilibrium selection in \(n\)-person coordination games
• p-Dominance and Belief Potential
• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
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• Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
• Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment
• Continuous approximation of dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals
• A finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an \(n\) players coordination game
• An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
• Experimentation, imitation, and stochastic stability
• A Comment on "Learning, Mutation, and Long-Run Equilibria in Games"
• Evolution of interdependent preferences in aggregative games
• Long run equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly.
• Stochastically stable states in an oligopoly with differentiated goods: Equivalence of price and quantity strategies
• Evolutionary equilibria resistant to mutation
• The evolution of Walrasian behavior in oligopolies

Cited In (14)

• Small population effects in stochastic population dynamics
• Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games
• Evolutionary Game Theory
• Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks
• Life histories with lottery competition in a stochastic environment: ESSs which do not prevail
• Demographic stochasticity alters the outcome of exploitation competition
• Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations
• A stochastic model of evolutionary dynamics with deterministic large-population asymptotics
• Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations
• Simple formulas for stationary distributions and stochastically stable states
• Large deviations and equilibrium selection in large populations
• Pricing in Bertrand competition with increasing marginal costs
• Economic Darwinism
• Evolutionary Stability for Large Populations and Backward Induction

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