Equilibrium selection in n-person coordination games
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Publication:1815581
DOI10.1006/GAME.1996.0066zbMATH Open0859.90131OpenAlexW2146033341MaRDI QIDQ1815581FDOQ1815581
Publication date: 18 November 1996
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0066
equilibrium selection\(n\)-person generalized coordination gamesmultiple Pareto rankable strict Nash equilibria
Cited In (35)
- ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES AND DYNAMIC STABILITY
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- Three-player games with strategy-dependent time delays
- Stable risk-sharing
- Dynamic focal points in \(N\)-person coordination games
- Stochastically stable equilibria in \(n\)-person binary coordination games
- Stochastic stability in three-player games with time delays
- Uncertainty and Endogenous Selection of Economic Equilibria
- Implicit coordination in an \(n\)-player target selection game
- Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) coordination games
- The noncooperative transportation problem and linear generalized Nash games
- Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in normal form games
- Robust stochastic stability
- The limit to behavioral inertia and the power of default in voluntary contribution games
- \(p\)-dominance and equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics.
- Efficient ex-ante stabilization of firms
- Entropy-norm space for geometric selection of strict Nash equilibria in \(n\)-person games
- Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations
- When will party whips succeed? Evidence from almost symmetric voting games
- Bandwagon effects and constrained network formation
- Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
- Perfect foresight dynamics in games with linear incentives and time symmetry
- Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
- Resolving indeterminacy in coordination games: A new approach applied to a pay-as-you-go pension scheme
- Exploration-exploitation in multi-agent learning: catastrophe theory meets game theory
- The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation
- Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in \(N\)-player games
- A finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an \(n\) players coordination game
- Equilibrium selection via replicator dynamics in \(2 \times 2\) coordination games
- Evolutionary multiplayer games
- Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks
- A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH TO EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Noisy equilibrium selection in coordination games
- Learning and equilibrium transitions: stochastic stability in discounted stochastic fictitious play
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