Equilibrium selection in \(n\)-person coordination games

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Publication:1815581

DOI10.1006/game.1996.0066zbMath0859.90131OpenAlexW2146033341MaRDI QIDQ1815581

Youngse Kim

Publication date: 18 November 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0066




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