Resolving indeterminacy in coordination games: A new approach applied to a pay-as-you-go pension scheme

DOI10.1007/S00712-007-0256-4MaRDI QIDQ2385086zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Luigi Bonatti

Publication date 11 October 2007

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-007-0256-4

zbMATH Keywords

eductive viewpointequilibrium selectionglobal gamesprinciple of insufficient reasonrational beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge
• Balanced-budget rules and macroeconomic (in)stability
• COORDINATION ON SADDLE-PATH SOLUTIONS: THE EDUCTIVE VIEWPOINT—LINEAR UNIVARIATE MODELS
• Equilibrium selection in \(n\)-person coordination games
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
• Prior Probabilities
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games

Cited in

(3)

• Endogenous convention, prejudice, and trust in demographic summary games
• Uncertainty and Endogenous Selection of Economic Equilibria
• Public versus Private Retirement Pensions: A Stackelberg Differential Game

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