Endogenous convention, prejudice, and trust in demographic summary games

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2014.04.004MaRDI QIDQ2452223zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors V. W. Kolpin

Publication date 2 June 2014

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.04.004

zbMATH Keywords

discontinuous gamesendogenous sharingnonatomic gamesprejudicetrust

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cites work

• A unifying pair of Cournot-Nash equilibrium existence results
• An equilibrium closure result for discontinuous games
• Continuous selections. I
• Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
• Equilibrium points of nonatomic games
• Existence of Nash equilibrium in games with a measure space of players and discontinuous payoff functions
• Pure strategy equilibria in large demographic summary games
• The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization

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