The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization
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Publication:4845247
DOI10.2307/2171906zbMATH Open0839.90147OpenAlexW2075475763MaRDI QIDQ4845247FDOQ4845247
Authors:
Publication date: 23 June 1996
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171906
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Cited In (34)
- Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games
- Balance and discontinuities in infinite games with type-dependent strategies
- The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- Correlated play in weakest-link and best-shot group contests
- Dynamic games with an application to climate change models
- Subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in continuous games of almost perfect information
- The commons with capital markets
- Polyequilibrium
- Stationary Markov perfect equilibria in risk sensitive stochastic overlapping generations models
- Endogenous convention, prejudice, and trust in demographic summary games
- Markov equilibria in discounted stochastic games
- Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information
- On a noncooperative stochastic game played by internally cooperating generations
- Pareto improvement and agenda control of sequential financial innovations
- Markov stationary equilibria in stochastic supermodular games with imperfect private and public information
- Interview with Andrzej Nowak -- laureate of the Rufus Isaacs Award
- General equilibrium with endogenously incomplete financial markets
- On the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium
- Subgame perfect equilibria in stage games
- Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria in finite exchange economies.
- Trimmed equilibrium
- Individual upper semicontinuity and subgame perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibria in games with almost perfect information
- The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints
- On approximate and weak correlated equilibria in constrained discounted stochastic games
- Existence of perfect equilibria in a class of multigenerational stochastic games of capital accumulation
- Subgame-perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information: dispensing with public randomization
- A never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games
- Stationary almost Markov perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games
- Sequential decisions under uncertainty and the maximum theorem
- Games played in a contracting environment
- Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities.
- Interactive information design
- Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria
- Existence of equilibria in constrained discontinuous games
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