Do not aim too high nor too low: moderate expectation-based group formation promotes public cooperation on networks
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:1782973)
Recommendations
- Sort out your neighbourhood. Public good games on dynamic networks
- Expectation driven by update willingness promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Promoting cooperation by reputation-driven group formation
- Cooperation in Evolving Social Networks
- Evolutionary games defined at the network mesoscale: the public goods game
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
- Diversity of reproduction rate supports cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game on complex networks
- Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation
- Game theory and physics
- Global migration can lead to stronger spatial selection than local migration
- Invasion and expansion of cooperators in lattice populations: prisoner's dilemma vs. snowdrift games
- Learning dynamics in social dilemmas
- Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules
- Stochastic sampling of interaction partners versus deterministic payoff assignment
- Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment
Cited in
(5)- Evolutionary dynamics of \(N\)-person snowdrift game
- Imitating winner or sympathizing loser? Quadratic effects on cooperative behavior in prisoners' dilemma games
- Continuous spatial public goods game with self and peer punishment based on particle swarm optimization
- Individual choice and reputation distribution of cooperative behaviors among heterogeneous groups
- Evolutionary dynamics of synergistic and discounted group interactions in structured populations
This page was built for publication: Do not aim too high nor too low: moderate expectation-based group formation promotes public cooperation on networks
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1782973)