Evolutionary dynamics of synergistic and discounted group interactions in structured populations
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2630325
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.04.008zbMath1341.92060OpenAlexW2001326955WikidataQ53259085 ScholiaQ53259085MaRDI QIDQ2630325
Publication date: 27 July 2016
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.04.008
Problems related to evolution (92D15) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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