Voluntary vaccination dilemma with evolving psychological perceptions

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.11.011zbMath1397.92631OpenAlexW2773891921WikidataQ47281665 ScholiaQ47281665MaRDI QIDQ1752515

Bin Wu, Xue Feng, Long Wang

Publication date: 24 May 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.11.011

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theoryimitation dynamicsdisease-behavior systemself-learning update rulevaccination dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Epidemiology (92D30) Mathematical psychology (91E99)

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Cites Work

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